FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 36 NUMBER 19

A Fresh Look at Russia

by George F. Kennan

I do not think that sufficient account is being taken of the changes that have come over Russia since Stalin's death, both in spirit and method of internal administration and in the approach to other Communist states and to Communist parties and groups in the non-Communist world. I think there is still a tendency to overemphasize the military element in Soviet policy and to construct in this way the image of a Soviet policy based primarily on the desire to launch military attacks wherever there is not deterrence in the form of an alliance with the United States or American military aid.

This is a gross and dangerous oversimplification of the nature of Soviet foreign policy, which leaves out many of the most important elements. I deplore the frequent insistence on ignoring all gradations in the Kremlin's relations to fellow travelers and other groups in third countries friendly to Soviet policy, to portray all these people as merely the blind stooges of Moscow and to impute their acts and words exclusively to Moscow dictation. Such relationships have existed and still do to some extent; but there is also such a thing as normal Russian influence, and there are people who support Soviet policy for reasons of their own without accepting any bond of discipline to Moscow.

I am worried, finally, about the persistent tendency here to ignore the spontaneous nature of many of the situations in third countries which operate to Soviet advantage and are naturally exploited by Soviet diplomacy to the best of its ability. It is greatly misleading to portray as the product of some sort of Soviet aggression situations which actually existed before the Communists had any appreciable part to play in them and which would be scarcely less ugly today had there been no Communist influence at all.

These distortions are all dangerous from two standpoints. They can lead to the impression, on the Communist side, that American utterances and policies are disingenuous; and in this way they can mislead the Soviet leaders as to our real motive and views. More importantly still, they can dull the sensitivity of our own people to the real facts. The problems facing us in our relations with the Kremlin are bitter enough in their true complexity without being made worse by distortion or oversimplification at our end. Their solution will take all the realism and subtlety of understanding we can muster.

(Remarks made at the Overseas Press Club, New York, on May 7 by the former United States Ambassador to Russia, whose book, *Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton University Press, 1956) has been awarded the Pulitzer prize for history.)

JUNE 15, 1957

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
345 EAST 46TH STREET • NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

WASHINGTON NEWSLETTER

What Shake-up of Soviet Industry Means

The recent shake-up of Soviet industry is the biggest thing that has happened to it since 1928 — the year Russia's series of Five-Year Plans was started. Basically, it is a shift-over from organization by industry to organization by region, from central control to decentralized control, from vertical to horizontal lines of authority.

Under the old system there were 35 industrial ministries, each one directing all the activities of that particular industry throughout the vast area of the U.S.S.R. It was a cumbersome, wasteful and inefficient system. There was duplication, cross-hauling, underutilization of capacity. Each ministry had its own repair shops, its own bureacracy, with no teamwork between them. Each was a self-contained empire; and all orders went up and down, not horizontally. There was no room for local initiative. It was the ultimate in overcentralization. As all the decisions were taken in Moscow, all the headaches centered in Moscow.

Regional Decentralization

The new system is organization by region. Eight industrial ministries have been kept; but these all include fields directly tied to defense, including the famous "medium machine industry" ministry—the euphemism used for Russia's atomic energy activities. The other ministries are replaced by 92 councils of national economy to be spread over the 16 Soviet republics composing the Soviet Union. And sitting on top of all these councils is the Gosplan—state planning authority—or super-ministry. Gosplan is now the key agency in the Soviet economy. The new head of Gosplan, announced on May 4, is a young and unknown Soviet bureaucrat, Joseph Josefovich Kuzmin. He was so far down in the Soviet hierarchy that until last month little was known about him. Yet now he has been elevated to the post of first deputy premier, and is one of the top seven officials in the U.S.S.R.

This new industrial organization is also set up along political lines. While 68 of the councils of national economy are in the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), and therefore still centered in Moscow (Moscow is the capital of the RSFSR as well as of the U.S.S.R.), and 11 in the Ukraine, the other 13 are divided up among the remaining Soviet republics, making administrative areas coincide with republic divisions of the U.S.S.R. This arrangement should increase the prestige and authority of the republic regimes, particularly since the economic councils must report to the republic governments and these governments have a veto over their plans—except, of course, as Moscow can veto a republic's actions. What this reorganization, however, does is to provide more elbowroom for operations, to decentralize headaches, to foster local initiative and, to some extent, shake up Soviet bureaucracy.

But if there are advantages to be expected from this shake-up, there are also disadvantages. The physical change alone — shifting ministries, moving bureaucrats around, redrawing lines of authority—will cause a certain amount of confusion, dislocation and disruption. It should give a lot of local eager-beavers a chance to show what they can do, but it also creates the risk that they will stick their necks out; for while initiative is encouraged by this change, it must always, of course, be acceptable to Moscow. With a diffusion of decision-making it is quite possible that some officials may take few if any decisions, while others may overstep their authority.

This reorganization does not change the inherently wasteful character of Soviet industry—where decisions are taken not for economic reasons alone, but often for political reasons. The Soviet leaders operate on the belief in the superiority of mind over market—that is, the superiority of a blueprint over the practical market-place operation in deciding production schedules, prices and so on.

A final problem Moscow faces

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: JOHN S. BADEAU • BENJAMIN J. BUTTENWIESER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMENY • AUGUST HECKSCHER • MRS. W. HOUSTON KENYON, JR. • PHILIP E. MOSELY • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE • ANNA LORD STRAUSS. JOHN W. NASON, *President;* VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor;* NEAL STANFORD, *Washington Contributor;* FELICE SOLOMON, *Assistant Editor.* • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: $4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347 *Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.*

FOREIGN POLICY FORUM

by Willard F. Libby

with this new system—and of this, Communist party boss Nikita S. Khrushchev seems fully aware — is that it may foster regionalism at the expense of national loyalty. In presenting the new system to the Supreme Soviet on May 7, Mr. Khrushchev was careful to warn the republics of this particular danger and to make clear that Moscow will stand for no separatist thoughts. In a sense the Communist party is the interregional cement that binds the new system to the national state.

It can be argued endlessly whether this new Soviet industrial system will or will not improve the economic lot of the Russians. Some Washington officials believe all it does is to decentralize Soviet economic problems. Actually, the industrial system was becoming too top-heavy. Soviet industry had expanded so much in the last two decades as to make control of all production from Moscow almost physically impossible. Because organizationally the new system could not be worse than the previous one, it may be said that therefore it has to be better. But this is not saying that the new system will not have most of the built-in faults of its predecessor. The difference is the faults will now be spread throughout the U.S.S.R., not concentrated in Moscow.

The real trouble, according to some Washington experts, is not the way Soviet industry is organized but the wasteful social system of the U.S.S.R. But even Khrushchev is not expected to try to reorganize that.

NEAL STANFORD

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

How to Make Foreign Aid Less Controversial

The last-minute breathless scramble over appropriations for foreign aid which for a decade has been an annual feature of spring in Washington assumed a near-disastrous character this year as Republicans and Democrats vied with each other to trim the Federal budget.

There is an understandable temptation, very difficult to resist, for Congressmen to cut those items which seemingly have no direct bearing on the personal or community interests of their constituents. And every year those officials and rank-and-file citizens who believe that foreign aid is now an integral part of our national policy, and therefore of concern to all voters, have had an uphill fight to communicate their belief to the country in general and to Congress in particular.

Yet to a layman, at least, it seems that this recurring task of explanation could be considerably eased by four measures, two of which now appear to be on the point of being accepted:

1. *Separation of Military and Economic Expenditures.* Supporters of foreign aid have been slow in making clear to the public that the bulk of what is commonly listed as "foreign aid" is expended, not for direct economic assistance of various kinds, but for military defense of a few nations with which we have alliances or other special ties—among them Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Pakistan and Nationalist China on Formosa.

In his foreign aid message to Congress on May 21 President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave a breakdown of his program which should have been in the hands of every voter right along. This breakdown shows that out of the proposed total of $3,865,000,000 for mutual assistance (this is about $1 billion less than the 1956 figure), $1.9 billion goes to military equipment and services and $900 million to defense support; $765 million goes to technical cooperation, nonmilitary programs including peaceful use of the atom, and the proposed development loan fund; and $300 million is allocated to emergency assistance.

Seen in this form, the mutual assistance program represents a modest expenditure by the wealthiest country in the world for economic assistance, which now, with the termination of the multibillion dollar Marshall Plan for Western Europe, goes for the most part to underdeveloped countries. The major part, as the President pointed out both in his message and in his TV address to the nation, is spent on defense measures which the United States would have to undertake with its own manpower if these were eliminated from the budget, and probably at a considerably higher cost. It is therefore important, as the Administration now proposes, that "defense assistance programs should be separated from programs for economic development" and that "defense assistance should be recognized and treated as an integral part of our own world-wide defense efforts." Then, and only then, can the American voters and the Congressmen who represent them decide on the merits of the issues—and not in an emotional urge to dispense with "globaloney"—whether this country does or does not want to continue its current defense expenditures at the present level.

2. *Loans Preferable to Grants.* Economic aid experts have been urg-

(Continued on page 151)

How Dangerous Is Radioactive Fallout?

by Willard F. Libby

Dr. Libby has been a member of the Atomic Energy Commission since 1954 and was a member of its General Advisory Committee, 1950-54. His article is reprinted with permission from the New York *Herald Tribune*, where it appeared on May 5, 1957.

(Public interest in the pros and cons of radiation fallout has reached a high peak, not only outside the United States but also, more recently, among the American public. A special subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy opened hearings on May 26 on the dangers of continued nuclear tests. And on May 18 George Gallup, director of the American Institute of Public Opinion, announced that, in a dramatic change of public thinking, 63 percent of all adults questioned now believe that the United States should agree to stop making any more nuclear tests if all nations, including Russia, agree to do so, as contrasted with 24 percent in the autumn of 1956, after Adlai Stevenson had made his campaign statement favoring suspension of tests.—Editor)

THE United States Atomic Energy Commission, in line with its responsibilities for protecting the public health and safety, has engaged in an intensive effort to determine the facts on radioactive fallout and make them public. Its only purpose is to present the facts—and all the facts—which are based on sound scientific study judgment.

This effort has included the collection of several hundred thousand samples of dust and thousands of samples of soil, water, plants, foods and specimens of bone, both in this country and at other locations around the world. Not only the land and the oceans, but also the stratosphere, have been sampled for radioactivity.

We have obtained unusual specimens such as snow water from the polar regions, penguins, and parts of polar bears, as well as more prosaic materials such as milk, cheese and eggs from this and other countries.

Many Study Radiation

At the same time that this world-wide program has provided information on the levels of fallout radioactivity, the commission has sponsored scores of research projects in its own laboratories, and at universities and other research institutions, to learn more about the effects of radiation upon living things.

The information obtained has been issued publicly. I do not know of any significant information on fallout in the possession of the commission which is not presently available to the public.

The commission has provided its data without reserve to the United Nations Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation, an international body which is collating information on the subject and which was established at the recommendation of the United States.

What have we learned as a result of the program which I have briefly described? In terms of public health and safety, the most important conclusion is that the risk from test fallout is extremely small.

Without going into technical detail, important facts on fallout include the following:

Three Kinds of Fallout

1. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of radioactive fallout; local, tropospheric and stratospheric. Local fallout can produce high levels of radioactivity in relatively localized areas downwind from a nuclear explosion. That is why controlled areas are established around the test sites. Local fallout does not contribute to world-wide radioactivity.

Tropospheric fallout comes from the troposphere — the lower part of the atmosphere. It is deposited in a band around the earth at the same general latitudes as the test sites, and descends to the earth's surface in a few weeks, or a month or so. Stratospheric fallout comes from tiny radioactive particles carried into the stratosphere after large nuclear detonations. It descends fairly uniformly over the earth's surface over a period of years.

2. Local fallout is insignificant unless the fireball of the detonation touches or closely approaches the earth's surface. It can be produced by small or large detonations, depending upon the height of the burst and the weather conditions at the time. Kiloton detonations — those equivalent to thousands but not millions of tons of TNT in energy release — produce tropospheric fallout, but usually do not push radioactive particles into the stratosphere. Stratospheric fallout results from the largest explosions; those equivalent to millions of tons of TNT.

3. The method of occurrence of world-wide distribution of fallout radioactivity is as follows: a gradual sifting down of low-level radioactivity from the stratosphere occurs fairly uniformly throughout the world. Most of the original radioactivity has decayed by the time the particles

(Continued on page 149)

by Linus Pauling

Dr. Pauling, who won the Nobel prize in chemistry in 1954, is professor of chemistry at the California Institute of Technology. He is author of several books and a frequent consultant to government agencies and research groups. His article is reprinted with permission from the New York *Herald Tribune,* where it appeared on May 5, 1957.

STOPPING the [nuclear] tests would be a good step toward averting a superbomb war. Secondly, they are doing damage to the health of the people of the world and to the pool of human germ plasm that determines the nature of future generations of human beings.

The danger that a nuclear war would break out would become very much greater than it is now if these weapons were to get into the possession of many countries, including countries whose leaders, in some future year, might be irresponsible, reckless of consequences, or even insane.

An international agreement to stop the tests would stop the spread of these weapons and would be a first step toward general disarmament. Inspection is simple. No large bomb can be detonated without detection.

Misleading Statements

It is difficult to discover exactly how great the damage is that is done by fallout radiation to health and germ plasm. Some statements about the magnitudes of the effects are misleading.

For example, it may be said that the average amount of fallout strontium-90 would do no harm. But in fact the maximum permissible amount, which is an arbitrary standard set by health authorities, does harm. It has a large chance of causing bone cancer and similar diseases, and even one-thousandth of this amount per person in the whole world could cause thousands of people to die.

While the radiation due to fallout from atomic bomb tests, including strontium-90, is small compared with that from cosmic rays and other natural sources, the effects of the bomb-test radiation are not negligible. The National Academy of Sciences report emphasizes that even small amounts of radiation are harmful.

The bomb tests that have been made so far will ultimately have caused the deaths of about 1 million persons in the world. These 1 million persons will have died ten or twenty or thirty years earlier than their life span because the radiation has produced bone cancer, leukemia or some other disease.

These bomb tests will also cause the birth of 200,000 seriously defective children in the next generation of human beings, children with serious mental deficiency or serious physical defects.

If the British Christmas Island tests are carried out and one superbomb, with five megatons equivalent of fission, is exploded, it will cause the deaths from cancer and other diseases of 100,000 persons now in the world and will increase by 20,000 the number of serious defective children born in the next generation.

(According to Dr. Pauling, these estimates were based on available information including the National Academy of Sciences report of last year.)

Although the effects of the bomb tests are small compared to the millions who die of cancer and are born defective in each world generation, in an absolute sense the estimated effect is no small matter, no negligible effect.

It is, indeed, a crime, a crime against the human race. It is immoral, a violation of the principles of humanity.

The biological effects of the bomb tests already carried out cannot be averted; they are inevitable. But if another ten superbombs are exploded in the next few years, the damage will be doubled. The bomb tests must be stopped.

Libby

(Continued from page 148)

reach the ground, but some long-lived radioactive materials remain, and these are of the greatest importance in evaluating the effects of this fallout.

A band of somewhat higher radioactivity circles the earth in the same latitudes as the test sites, due to tropospheric fallout.

Possible Hazards

4. There are two possible hazards from this world-wide distribution of low-level radioactivity. The first is a possible hazard due to irradiation by penetrating gamma radiation from fallout materials outside the body. This hazard may be either genetic, due to irradiation of the reproductive organs, or to health, due to whole body effects. The second is a possible hazard to health due to the irradiation of the bones by radioactive strontium taken up in food and deposited in the skeleton. These two effects should not be confused; strontium does not appreciably irradiate the reproductive organs.

5. The magnitude of each of these effects is dependent upon the amount of radiation exposure. All of the information available to the commission indicates that fallout radiation exposures at the present rate of testing are far too small to result in observable effects among the population.

Let me amplify this last point. The conclusion that the risk is very small —and it is a conclusion reached not only by scientists working directly on fallout studies, but also by authoritative groups such as the National Academy of Sciences and the British Medical Research Council— has two general bases.

The first of these is that the radiation dosages from fallout are extremely small compared with the permissible amount of radiation exposure recommended for the public by the most authoritative bodies — the United States National Committee on Radiation Protection, the International Commission on Radiological Protection, the National Academy of Sciences, and the British Medical Research Council. The permissible exposures for the public are one-tenth of those recommended for atomic-energy workers, and the latter are believed to be considerably smaller than exposures which would produce detectable effects.

The present concentration of radioactive strontium in newly formed bones, such as those of children, in the United States today is less than one-hundredth of the permissible level recommended for the public. The strontium concentration in adult bones is several times smaller. (Concentrations in persons elsewhere in the world are generally smaller than those in the United States.)

The external dosages from fallout, that is, those which might cause genetic effects, have averaged between one- and five-thousandths of one roentgen per year in the United States during the last three or four years. This compares with a permissible dosage of ten roentgens in thirty years for whole populations recommended by the National Academy of Sciences.

The second basis for the conclusion that the risk is slight is that the radiation dosages from fallout are extremely small compared with the radiation exposures which living things always have received from the natural radiation "background."

Radiation All Around Us

Background radiation is composed of cosmic rays from outer space and radiation from naturally radioactive materials in the soil, air, water, plants and animals, and in our own bodies. We all carry in our bodies and have in our surroundings amounts of natural radioactivity very much larger than those derived from radioactive fallout.

The natural radiation background varies considerably from place to place. It increases with altitude, because of increased cosmic ray intensity. Above-normal background radiation also occurs in localities of uranium or thorium mineralization. Thus, persons increase their exposure to natural radiation by moving to a higher altitude, or going from an area of sedimentary rock formation to one of granite rock.

The additional radiation dosages which persons are receiving from test fallout are small compared with natural background dosages, and even compared with the variations in natural dosages from locality to locality.

We do not know of any bad effects of natural radiation exposure upon populations living in areas of above-normal background, although this question should be given further study. At any rate, if such effects exist, they are too small to be readily detected. Any effects from test fallout are far smaller.

As stated above, the external radiation dosages from fallout — those of genetic concern — have averaged between one- and five-thousandths of a roentgen annually. These figures should be compared with a normal background dosage of about 150-thousandths of a roentgen annually. In other words, the external fallout radiation has been from 0.7 percent to about 3 percent of the natural radiation exposure.

In certain parts of the world, brick or concrete block houses may contain enough natural radioactive material to expose persons living in them to more radiation than persons who live in wooden houses. These additional dosages may range from 40- to 100-thousandths of a roentgen —8 to 100 times the dosages from test fallout.

Radium Dial Comparison Made

To take another common type of slight radiation exposure, a radium-dial wrist watch may give up to 40-thousandths of a roentgen annually to the sex organs. This is eight to forty times the fallout dosage.

The irradiation of bone by radioactive strontium, taken into the body with food, is small compared with the irradiation of bone by the penetrating cosmic rays from space.

In the United States persons living at sea level receive about 37-thousandths of a roentgen annually from cosmic rays, and persons at an altitude of 5,000 feet receive about 60-thousandths of a roentgen annually. In comparison, in these latitudes, the average exposure of newly formed bones in the United States from radioactive strontium is about 1.5-thousandths of a roentgen — about one-sixteenth of the additional cosmic ray exposure at an altitude of 5,000 feet.

Expressed in another way, the additional irradiation of bone from radioactive strontium is about equal to that which the bones of a person at sea level would receive from cosmic rays if he moved from the beach to the top of a hill a few hundred feet high.

Effects on Food

Foods grown on calcium-deficient soil will have a higher strontium con-

tent than average. Also, some persons living in a given locality may assimilate more strontium than others. Therefore, variations from the average should be considered. Detailed studies of this question indicate that about one individual in 300 will have more than twice the average strontium concentration for a given locality, and that about one in several million will have three times the average value. In areas of calcium-deficient soils, persons might accumulate a maximum of five times the normal strontium concentrations.

What about future testing? If tests were to continue until 1983 at the rate of the last five years, levels in the United States would be expected to reach about four times their present values, and levels about six times the present ones would be reached by the year 2011 if tests were to continue for that long. These levels still would be small compared to natural radiation exposure.

I believe these figures show that nuclear tests have constituted a very small risk. Populations may expose themselves to much larger additional amounts of radiation by living in one locality rather than in another, and these additional amounts of natural radiation dosage have not produced any readily detectable effects.

Certainly the risk involved in many of our normal activities is much greater than the hazard from fallout.

Weighing Two Risks

I do not mean that there is no risk at all. What is important for every one to realize is that there is some risk, but that the risk is very small compared to many other risks which we accept voluntarily, or which are an inevitable part of life.

This small risk must be weighed against the risk which we in the United States, as well as persons throughout the free world, would take if nuclear weapons tests were to be abandoned before some safeguarded system of international disarmament is achieved. Tests are necessary if we are not to fall behind in nuclear weapons development.

This country is continuing to strive for the attainment of a sound disarmament system, and we should all pray that these efforts will succeed. Until that time, I believe the risk involved in nuclear tests is small indeed, compared with the terrible future we might face if we fell behind in our nuclear defense effort.

Spotlight

(Continued from page 147)

ing for some time that the United States should substitute long-term assistance—the minimum period being five years — for annual appropriations, which in the Congressional struggle for economy are often subject to political decisions concerning this or that recipient country; and to make aid available primarily in the form of long-term repayable loans rather than of outright grants.

Three Advantages

This arrangement, according to the experts, would have three major advantages. First, the country receiving aid would be able to include it in its long-term plans—and most of the underdeveloped countries have development plans varying from three to six years' duration. Second, the recipients would feel that they were obtaining aid on dignified, equal-to-equal terms, instead of being charity wards of the United States, with all the dangers of political pressures, real or imagined, that this entails. And third, the American taxpayer would feel that economic assistance had been placed on a business-like basis, even if the recipients might have to stretch repayment of the loans over a long period.

The Administration has met this need by proposing that "economic development assistance should be provided primarily through loans, on a continuing basis, and related closely to technical assistance." In contrast to the proposal of the Senate's Special Committee on Foreign Aid, which wants to have the loan fund handled by a new government corporation, the President has recommended that it should be administered by the International Cooperation Administration, which now handles foreign aid. The President has included the sum of $500 million dollars as the amount to be placed in a revolving loan fund for 1957, but anticipates that as the development plans of underdeveloped countries move forward, the fund will require capital of $750 million in each of the fiscal years 1959 and 1960. Either of these sums is less than .3 of 1 percent of our national income.

3. *Economic Policy Problems.* These two major moves will do much to clarify the character and scope of foreign aid—which Washington, very properly, prefers to call mutual assistance.

However, now that the American public recognizes such aid has come to stay, it is essential to consider it within the over-all framework of this country's economic policy. Otherwise, there is the constant danger that many people will assume aid can be a substitute for trade and, while supporting aid, will continue to oppose the liberalization of import policies and/or the broadening of trade by non-Communist nations with Red China. The result might be that some of the nations to which we are giving substantial military and economic assistance, notably Japan, will become increasingly critical of the United States because of their inability to find here the markets they need for their products, and will seek outlets in mainland China and elsewhere, as Egypt did

when it could not sell its cotton in the Western world.

4. *Political Policy Problems.* Sooner or later, we shall also have to face difficult political decisions flowing directly from foreign aid. These decisions, which vary from one recipient country to another, can be summed up by saying that we shall have to decide whether to give aid to governments which have no concern for democracy, which suppress the liberties of their peoples, and which on occasion use American funds for the enrichment of their own members and not for reforms that would improve public welfare. Complaints on this score have been made by many Americans, some objecting to aid to Saudi Arabia or Iran, others to Franco Spain, and still others to Yugoslavia, a number of Latin American dictatorships and so on.

In this respect we face a dilemma which is by no means easy to resolve. If the United States gives aid to existing governments, no matter how repugnant they may be to American tenets, it runs the risk of incurring the hostility of those groups of the population which are trying to carry out internal changes, if necessary by revolution, and of being repudiated if and when such changes occur. If, however, the United States should decide to use aid as a political lever, then both the native supporters of democracy and ourselves will have to weigh, in all frankness, the possibility and desirability of a new form of "colonialism," which would give Americans the authority to displace incompetent or corrupt or authoritarian governments, and replace them with new leadership dedicated to civil liberties and economic and social reforms.

Decisions of this kind go to the very roots of the changing world society, of which the United States is now inextricably a part. The only thing that seems clear at present is that if we do not make up our minds on these political issues, we must get used to being attacked by incumbent nondemocratic governments for intervention in their domestic affairs, and by their opponents, at home or in exile, for failing to practice abroad the democracy we preach.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

FPA Bookshelf

U.S. POLICY

The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950, by Norman A. Graebner. New York, Ronald, 1956. $4.00.

The author, a professor of history at Iowa State College, defines as "new isolationists" those who cling to the "concepts of American invincibility and moral righteousness inherited from the happy security of the 19th century." He contends that political pressure from this segment of our population has hampered American ability to negotiate for world order and has placed the Eisenhower Administration in the dilemma of maintaining party harmony while at the same time attempting to meet the demands of world peace.

Guided Missiles in War and Peace, by Nels A. Parson, Jr. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. $3.50.

A lucid exposition of the technicalities of guided missiles; an explanation of how they came into being and why they are needed; a forecast of their influence on air, naval and land combat operations; and an outline of their peacetime potentialities—by a major in the U.S. Army who has worked and studied in the field since the end of World War II and is now Chief of Review and Analysis Branch of Combat Developments. Illustrated with simple diagrams by the author and many excellent photographs.

MISCELLANEOUS

Dynamics of International Relations, by Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting. McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1956. $6.00.

A socio-psychological, group-behavior interpretation of the major aspects of international relations "from the point of view of the aims of policy makers," this book attempts to show "that contemporary national ideologies and institutions shape the nature" of these relations. Case studies are presented illustrating the effects of ideological and institutional forces in both democratic and totalitarian systems—for example, in Soviet-American relations between 1917 and 1933. Well-written, comprehensive in scope, with extensive bibliographies, this book is an important contribution to the understanding and the history of political thought and theory.

France in Crisis, edited by Elizabeth Davey. The Reference Shelf, Vol. 29, No. 2. New York, Wilson, 1957. $2.00.

A compilation of 35 articles reprinted from American periodicals in which they were published during the year December 1955-December 1956, including two from the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. The articles cover the essential problems facing France in regard to its political system, its foreign policy, and North Africa and the Suez crisis. Among the authors are Raymond Aron, D. W. Brogan, Harold Callender, Janet Flanner, Herbert Luethy, Saul K. Padover, James Reston, Benjamin Rivlin, André Siegfried, C. L. Sulzberger, and so on.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN
345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

In this issue:

A Fresh Look at Russia—
G. F. Kennan 145
What Shake-up of Soviet Industry Means—
N. Stanford 146
How To Make Foreign Aid Less Controversial—
V. M. Dean 147
How Dangerous Is Radioactive Fallout?—
W. F. Libby 148
L. Pauling 149
FPA Bookshelf 152

In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—
East Pakistan's Demand for Autonomy
by Stanley Maron